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ith the TLTRO II, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) introduced a ‘cash 
for loans’ scheme which might cost up 
to €24 billion, but whose impact on the real 
economy is likely to be marginal as banks can 
easily window dress their loan book. 
On March 10th, the ECB made a number of 
important monetary policy decisions. The most 
important ones were an expansion of the QE 
programme of about €20 billion a month, with 
the possibility to buy (investment-grade) 
corporate bonds, and a new set of targeted 
longer-term refinancing operations for banks. 
We do not comment further on this expansion of 
bond buying because too little is known about 
what bonds will be bought, and under what 
conditions.  
This contribution focuses on the new series of 
Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations 
(TLTRO II), which expands the previous TLTRO 
in two ways. First of all, it increases the amount 
that can be financed from 7% to 30% of the stock 
of eligible loans (i.e. loans to euro-area non-
financial corporations [NFCs] and households, 
excluding loans for house purchase).1  
                                                     
1 The small adjustment in interest rates also decided 
on that occasion appears of minor importance. The 
rate on the deposit facility was cut by an additional 
The more interesting innovation is the ‘cash for 
loans’ scheme: The interest rate applied to the 
TLTRO II operations (with a 4 years maturity) is 
equal to the main refinancing operations (MRO) 
rate at the time of borrowing (now it is at 0%). 
But if the net lending of the bank is by end 
January 2018 2.5% above a certain benchmark 
the interest applied to the entire operation 
would go down to the deposit facility rate of 
(currently) minus 0.4%. In other words, the 
banks would be paid by the ECB if they give out 
more loans. The total stock of eligible loans 
amounts at present to over €5,500 billion. In 
theory 30% of this, or more than €1,500 billion, 
could be re-financed by this new scheme.  
The TLTRO could thus become important. But is 
it likely to achieve its goal of encouraging the 
extension of credit for new investment? To 
answer this question we first analyse the 
benchmarks and the size of the incentive offered 
by this scheme and then show how the 
conditions to qualify for the cash from the ECB 
could be easily attained. 
                                                                                       
10bp to -0.40% and the marginal lending facility 
(MLF) rate by only 5 bp to 0.25%. The rate on main 
refinancing operations (MRO) reached 0%, after a cut 
of 5bp. 
W 
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Differentiated benchmarks 
The most innovative element of this second 
TLTRO is its promise to subsidise loans if 
lending exceeds a benchmark. Formally there 
are two benchmarks: for those banks with 
positive eligible net lending in the 12 months 
before 31 January 2016, the benchmark net 
lending is zero. These banks need to increase 
lending by 2.5% (until January 2018) to get the 
negative rate. For those banks that had a 
negative eligible net lending in the 12 months 
before 31 January 2016, the benchmark net 
lending is equal to that figure. If one takes a 
bank with a loan book of €100 billion and a net 
lending, for example, of minus €4 billion over 
the last year, this bank would qualify for the 
negative rate once it reaches a negative lending 
of minus €1.5 billion (2.5% of €100 billion minus 
€4 billion).  
The difference in benchmarks has a superficial 
plausibility. For those banks that had negative 
net lending, a facile assumption is that the trend 
would have continued to be negative. However, 
for banks that had positive net lending, the 
assumption seems to be that net lending would 
have been zero in the absence of this measure. A 
similar differentiated benchmark was adopted 
for the first TLTRO in 2014, when negative net 
lending was explicitly projected forward for one 
year as part of the benchmark. 
This is a proposition that can be tested. We 
performed a simple regression analysis with 
banks' growth in customer loans as proxy for net 
lending. We separated the cases of positive and 
negative loan growth and then checked within 
each group whether there is a significant 
relationship between net lending in any one 
year, and the net lending in the following two 
years (because the benchmark is net lending 
until 2018). For the negative net lending group, 
we find a significant negative relationship. 
Hence, the banks with a net loan growth below 
zero in any one year are likely to have a positive 
loan growth in the consecutive two years. The 
result is significant at the 1% level. However, for 
the cases of positive net lending we do not find 
any significant relationship with future lending. 
This simple result implies that the different 
benchmark for banks with negative net lending 
in 2015 might not be appropriate: banks that had 
negative net lending in any one year are anyway 
likely to bounce back with positive net lending 
in the following 2-year period. This regularity 
from the past indicates that especially the banks 
with negative net lending are likely to receive 
the ECB premium, even if they do not change 
their lending policies.  
It is also likely that this benchmark scheme may 
lead, de facto, to nationally differentiated 
monetary policy stances (or rather fiscal 
incentive schemes). In effect, the interest offered 
to banks is a function of past lending volumes 
and the lending pattern within each country 
tend to be highly correlated. Banks in countries 
where lending volumes had recently been 
contracting sharply would qualify for the -0.40% 
interest rate subsidy if they merely reduce the 
rate at which lending falls by 2.5% points. 
The cash incentive 
The incentive for additional lending could be 
substantial, if viewed against the entire lifetime 
of the operation. For instance, a bank for which 
the benchmark is zero and which had €100 
billion in eligible lending outstanding, as of 
January 2016, could borrow up to €30 billion 
under the TLTRO II at zero interest. If this bank 
then extended an additional €2.5 billion of credit 
to NFCs or households by January 2018, it 
would qualify for the lower interest rate on the 
entire amount it has outstanding under the 
TLTRO II (up to a maximum of €30 billion). 
Instead of ‘paying’ zero interest, it would get 
annually from the ECB 0.40% on (up to) €30 
billion in cash, or a maximum of €0.12 billion. 
As this will be valid for the entire lifetime of the 
operation (4 years), the total subsidy would be 
(at most) €0.48 billion. Compared to the 
additional risk to its balance sheet of €2.5 billion, 
which the bank incurred in order to qualify for 
the interest rebate, this amounts to almost 20% 
(0.48/2.5).2 
                                                     
2 Moreover, the financing conditions of the TLTRO II 
contain an option element as the rate is fixed, but 
repayment is at the discretion of the borrowing bank. 
There is no longer mandatory early repayment, even 
if net lending falls below the benchmark. Non-
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The incentive provided by the ECB can be 
compared with the Juncker plan, which also 
provides a subsidy to investment, but on a 
project basis with a risk reduction of around 
6.7%: every euro of EU capital put at risk was 
supposed to generate €15 of investment (= 6.7% 
first loss or equity). There now exists a 
substantial list of investments to be financed, 
but it is not clear to what extent this represents 
simply pre-existing projects that have been re-
jigged so that they qualify for this subsidy. 
A cost of additional loans, of course, is that they 
require additional capital. However, this cost is 
always there and covered by the interest rate 
spread charged to borrowers, under normal 
circumstances. Window-dressing loans would 
also require more capital. This additional cost 
should be moderate: assuming a 50% risk 
weight and a capital ratio of 12%, banks would 
have to hold €60 million extra capital for each 
billion of extra net lending. Assuming a cost of 
capital of 10% per annum, the total capital cost 
would be €24 million over four years.3 In the 
example above, the total capital cost of ‘window 
dressing loans’ of €2.5 billion would be €40 
million, a fraction of the interest rate subsidy of 
up to €480 million. Moreover, one has to keep in 
mind that actual aggregate net lending would 
need to grow much less than 2.5% even if all 
banks qualify for the interest rate reduction 
since for many banks the benchmark is a fall in 
lending. Given that this is the case for about 
one-third of all banks, it follows that aggregate 
lending growth would not have to be much 
larger than the one observed until today (close 
to 1%) to allow most banks to benefit from the 
cash hand-out under the TLTRO II. 
But the fate of the first TLTRO already showed 
that money is fungible par excellence. Banks can 
easily window dress their loan book, for 
example, by handing out loans for ‘working 
capital’ under which the bank gives a loan at 
                                                                                       
performing loans also count under the total eligible 
for the calculation.  
3 This is actually a maximum cost, since the net 
lending benchmark is based on the stock as of 
January 2018, if some of the loans outstanding at this 
point in time are repaid earlier the additional capital 
would not be needed for four years. 
zero interest to a company, which is then 
required to put the proceeds into a blocked 
account (possibly also at zero interest) as 
collateral. Moreover, banks can form groups (as 
allowed under TLTRO I). Within any group, 
those banks just under the benchmark (+2.5%) 
could benefit from the net lending of others, 
which are much above the benchmark and thus 
qualify anyway for the interest rate subsidy. The 
real new credit may (again) only be a fraction of 
the total TLTRO borrowing.  
Macroeconomic impact 
Total outstanding loans eligible under the 
TLTRO II are around €5,500 billion, implying 
that theoretically the total amount requested by 
banks could be up to €1,650 billion. From this 
sum one has to deduct the outstanding TLTRO 
(I) volume, leaving about €1,500 billion for the 
TLTRO II.  
The total expense (or loss of seigniorage 
revenues for the ECB) would be, under this 
hypothesis, about 0.40% of €1,500 billion, or €6 
billion for four years or €24 billion. This is a 
considerable sum for the euro area banking 
system; and this perspective explains why 
banking shares jumped after the announcement. 
However, given that there is not necessarily a 
link between loans and investment, the ‘cash for 
loans’ scheme might have a very limited impact 
on the real economy.  
Given the subsidy rate of about 20% calculated 
above the total amount of ‘incentivised’ loans 
(i.e. the lending which might not have 
materialised otherwise) would be about €120 
billion. The hope of the ECB might have been 
that these new loans would correspond to 
additional investment or consumption which 
otherwise would not have been undertaken. If 
this had been the case, the boost to demand 
would have been considerable, worth a bit more 
than 1% of euro area GDP. However, as shown 
above, it is unlikely that banks would actually 
finance new, risky projects when they can 
qualify for the cash without taking any risk. 
This potential €24 billion of explicit interest rate 
subsidy would be larger than the €21 billion 
total EU funds committed to the Juncker plan. If 
one puts these two measures together, one 
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obtains a total of about €45 billion of public 
money committed to increasing investment. It 
remains to be seen whether all this funding will 
lead to a substantial amount of new investment.  
Monetary versus fiscal policy 
Finally there is the question whether subsidising 
loans over a specific period of investment 
represents monetary or fiscal policy. The ‘cash 
for loans’ element in the TLTRO II is different 
from a ‘normal’ reduction in the lending rate 
which would apply to all new lending. All 
monetary policy decisions have some fiscal 
implications because any lowering of the 
lending rate leads to a loss of revenue for the 
ECB (or, more precisely, the Eurosystem) – 
unless the deposit rate is also lowered at the 
same time. Lowering the lending rate can thus 
have a direct impact on the so-called monetary 
income (in jargon, seigniorage) of the 
Eurosystem that is then distributed via the 
national central banks to national treasuries.4 In 
2014, the TLTRO I did not involve any loss of 
revenue since the rate was set at the normal 
refinancing rate plus 10 basis points. The 
Governing Council could have lowered the 
lending (MRO) rate on March 10 of this year to 
minus 40 basis points. This would also have led 
to a large loss of revenue unless the deposit rate 
had also been lower to keep a difference 
between the two. Changing one or more of its 
policy rates would clearly be in the realm of 
monetary policy. But trying to influence lending 
decisions with a temporary subsidy is 
something that normally governments do 
(typically in the form of state guarantees to 
lower the funding cost). 
There is a close precedent for the TLTRO II in 
the form of the Funding for Lending (FLS) 
scheme adopted in the UK in 2012 (see the box 
below for details), which elucidates the border 
area between monetary and fiscal policy. 
 
                                                     
4 There are of course other, indirect fiscal 
implications through the link between ECB policy 
rates and the market for short-term government 
paper. But these indirect effects are not the key issue 
for the TLTRO II. 
The UK experience with the Funding for Lending 
Scheme (FLS) 
In principle, the UK scheme had a similar 
objective as the TLTRO II: to motivate new 
lending. But, when it was launched in 2012, 
funding costs of banks were elevated (up to 
200 basis points above official rates), possibly 
because of the euro crisis, which cast a 
shadow over all European banks. Elevated 
funding costs are no longer an issue today. 
Moreover, the FLS was limited to 5% of the 
loan book, and it did not give banks direct 
access to funding, but only allowed them to 
‘borrow’ government bonds as collateral. 
There was to be a fee attached to the lending 
of the collateral. This fee was to be lower for 
banks with increasing loan books. The Bank 
of England (BoE) estimated that the total cost 
of converting the borrowed gilts into cash 
was about 75 basis points, which is higher 
than the direct discount window.  
The FLS thus did not involve any 
expenditure by the Bank of England, only 
some ‘rebate’ on the normal fee that the bank 
charged to banks, which would not increase 
their loan book. 
It is interesting to note that the committee 
which normally sets the policy instruments at 
the Bank of England, namely the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC), apparently did not 
even vote on the scheme. It only made the 
following cryptic comment: 
The Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC) has judged that there will be no 
material impact on the stance of 
monetary policy.  
This can only be taken to mean that the MPC 
did not even consider the FLS to be a 
monetary policy instrument. 
The effectiveness of the FLS is difficult to 
determine even some years later. Gros, Alcidi 
and Giovannini (2014) express scepticism 
about the basis of the lending data. Lending 
growth actually fell in the first year after its 
implementation. However, the FLS was 
renewed and lending rose for a while after 
two years, only to fall back again later.  
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A study by the Bank of England (Churm et 
al., 2015) comes to a much more positive 
conclusion based on the fact that overall 
funding costs for banks fell considerably after 
the introduction of this measure. But even 
this study did not firmly establish that the 
FLS contributed more than other 
macroeconomic factors to the drop in funding 
costs; and then that this drop resulted in 
greater investments in the economy. Churm 
et al. admit, however, that the samples they 
assess are still small and may not necessarily 
have captured all channels that affect funding 
costs or have an impact on growth and 
inflation. There are also other factors, beyond 
funding costs that can affect the investment 
channel. 
 
From the outset, the Bank of England was aware 
that its scheme was situated on the borderline 
between monetary and fiscal policy, leading to 
the release of the following official statement: 
The Bank has therefore sought and received 
an assurance from the Government that the 
objectives of the Scheme lie within its remit 
(as noted in the exchange of letters between 
the Governor and Chancellor on 13 July). 
And the Funding for Lending Scheme itself 
will be overseen by a joint Bank/HM 
Treasury Oversight Board, which will meet 
on a quarterly basis.  
In the UK, the conclusion was apparently that 
the Funding for Lending scheme was still in the 
grey zone between monetary and fiscal policy. A 
practical solution to represent the fiscal 
authorities was found in the form of a joint 
oversight board. Such a practical solution would 
de facto be very hard to implement in the euro 
area, as it would require a representation of the 
ECB and national finance ministries on a joint 
Board (or perhaps on the Eurogroup 
Presidency) to oversee an ECB monetary policy 
instrument. 
But in reality the fiscal authorities should have 
been involved since the TLTRO II represents 
clearly a commitment of public (euro area) 
money – even more so than the FLS.  
The ECB is clearly testing the limits of its 
mandate by stepping into the fiscal policy space. 
Is this what a central bank should be doing? 
Even if the economic benefit is likely to be slim? 
The jury is still out. 
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